Multi-bank loan pool contracts by Gintschel, Andreas & Hackethal, Andreas
 
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING
  
 
 
Andreas Gintschel and Andreas Hackethal 
 
Multi-Bank Loan Pool Contracts 
No. 129 
June 2004 
 
 
JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andreas Gintschel and Andreas Hackethal
** 
 
 
MULTI-BANK LOAN POOL CONTRACTS
 
 
 
 
No. 129 
June 2004 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author: Andreas Hackethal, Mertonstr. 17, 60325 Frankfurt a.M., Germany. E-mail: 
Hackethal@em.uni-frankfurt.de. Andreas Gintschel works for Deutsche Asset Management and at the University 
of Trier. Financial support from the E-Finance Lab is gratefully acknowledged 
 
 
Working Paper Series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other researchers in 
preliminary form, to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opinions are solely those of 
the authors.  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We show that multi-bank loan pools improve the risk-return profile of banks’ loan business.  
Banks write simple contracts on the proceeds from pooled loan portfolios, taking into account 
the free-rider problems in joint loan production.  Thus, banks benefit greatly from diversifying 
credit risk while limiting the efficiency loss due to adverse incentives.  We present calibration 
results that the formation of loan pools reduce the volatility in default rates, proxying for 
credit risk, of participating banks’ loan portfolios by roughly 70% in our sample.  Under rea-
sonable assumptions, the gain in return on equity (in certainty equivalent terms) is around 20 
basis points annually. 
 
 
EFM classification: 330, 350Introduction 
With the Basle Accord on capital adequacy and increasing default rates, academics and 
practitioners alike are turning attention to credit risk.  Discussions on measuring and 
managing credit risk often focus on the benefits and disadvantages of credit sales, asset-
backed securities, and credit derivatives.  Multi-bank loan pools, which we define as an 
instrument that allows participating banks to share profits and losses from a joint loan pool 
according to a multilateral contract, have been largely ignored.  We show that loan pools 
cater especially to the needs of smaller, regional banks. 
Loan pools exploit the diversification benefits available to large banks, spreading 
risk over many investments, while using local knowledge available to small banks, 
focusing on a specific market segment.  However, inducing the pool of banks to apply the 
same care in loan production as an independent bank would is difficult. In a pool, a bank 
spending extra resources on screening loan applicants and monitoring debtors recoups only 
a fraction in increased returns; other pool participants capture the rest without any effort of 
their own.  Optimal loan pool contracts take this problem into account trading off the 
benefits of diversification against diminished incentives to induce effort.   
For the class of contracts affine in a bank’s own loan portfolio returns and the 
pooled loan portfolio returns, we derive optimal contracts.  These optimal contracts are 
convex combinations of those returns, the weights depending on the parameters of the 
problem.  We further study the features of the optimal contracts as parameters vary.  We 
also calculate the benefits, measured as certainty equivalent returns, of loan pools.   
Calibrating an example to data on the regional dispersion of bankruptcy rates, we find that 
loan pools can almost eliminate idiosyncratic credit risk, reducing total credit risk 
(measured as volatility of portfolio returns) by as much as 70%.  The reduction in credit 
risk translates into a 20 basis point gain in certainty equivalent returns, after subtracting the 
efficiency loss to reduced effort. 
Loan pools have potentially great advantages for the institutions participating and 
also the economy as a whole.  The participating institutions can reduce significantly the risk 
of loans, which lowers cost of capital.  This, in turn, implies lower interest rate for loans, 
which gives rise to two macro-economic effects.  As a direct effect, lower interest rates will 
increase investment.  As an indirect effect, credit rationing (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) 
will occur at a lower level, inducing additional investment.   2
Compared to competing, market-based solutions, such as credit sales or issuing 
collateralized loan obligations (CLO’s), loan pools have probably lower transaction costs.  
Information asymmetries are likely to be greater between an originating bank and outside 
market investors than among loan pool participants, who are both originators and investors.  
Pool participants can employ their own screening technologies combined with local market 
knowledge to assess the credit risk in the pool.  Also, participating banks are probably more 
willing to share relevant information on loan quality and productivity levels with non-
competing peers than with a rating agency or a large number of outside investors.  Since 
information asymmetries have been identified to be a major impediment to transferring 
credit risk by market transactions, we suggest that multi-bank loan pools provide a cost-
efficient instrument to diversify credit risk.  Moreover, we argue that the cost of 
administering a multi-bank loan pool is lower than the combined costs for trust managers, 
investment banks, lawyers etc that originator banks face in the context of single-seller CLO 
transactions. 
Taking advantage of diversification and exploiting local knowledge, loan pools are 
also an alternative to bank mergers.  Small banks retain their independence, which provides 
an ideal setting for the generation and exploitation of local knowledge, while achieving 
diversification usually available only to large banks.  Of course, various outsourcing 
activities may augment loan pools; e.g., in back office operations, information technology, 
securities trading, and other departments not vital to the core business.  In this way, small 
banks can efficiently focus on the core competencies in retail banking and lending to small 
and medium-sized business. 
The paper is structured as follows. After briefly reviewing the related literature in 
section 1, we present our model of credit risk in joint loan production and derive optimal 
contracts in section 2. In section 3, we provide a numerical example based on an empirical 
analysis of cross-sectional variation of bankruptcy rates.  We show what multi-bank loan 
contracts might look like in the real world and gauge the benefit to participating banks.  
Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
1. Related  Literature 
The theoretical literature on the transfer of credit risks and on pooling, repacking and 
selling of bank assets in particular, focuses on single-seller settings.  Most papers consider 
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one value-maximizing financial institution and derive optimal contracts between the 
financial institution and outside investors.  More recent work also devises pricing schemes 
on securitized asset pools.
1  We are, however, not aware of work addressing contracts 
between several originating banks which reduce asset volatility while controlling adverse 
incentives. 
Most papers address hidden information;  how can investors avoid the lemon 
problem of purchasing a portfolio of bad loans?  Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) analyze the 
effect of adverse selection problems on the balance sheet structure of financial institutions 
that possess private information on the risk of the assets.  These financial institutions 
securitize and sell assets with a low risk profile and retain the remaining high-risk loans on 
their books.  Agency problems hence preclude an optimal amount of credit risk transfer.   
In a hidden action setting similar to ours, Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and 
Pennacchi (1995) devise optimal contracts for credit sale transactions given that the seller’s 
ex post monitoring efforts are not observable to the buyer. They analyze how sellers can 
mitigate the agency costs that emerge from this hidden action problem by retaining a 
portion of the loan.  They conclude that under the optimal contract, this portion is a positive 
function of the loan’s risk and that both, the level of monitoring. Again, the amount of 
credit risk to be transferred, is lower than under a first-best scenario.   
A substantial strand of literature analyzes optimal design of asset-backed securities 
providing an economic rationale for real-world deal structures.  Important contributions are 
Boot and Thakor (1993), Glaeser and Kallal (1997), Riddiough (1997), DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1999), and DeMarzo (1999).  Assuming asymmetric information between 
originator and investors, they show how bundling assets, repackaging the proceeds from 
these assets into different claims, and selling these claims in capital markets can reduce 
agency costs and thus maximize the benefits from securitization.  Usually, pay-through 
securities constitute the optimal security design, with a senior claim sold to less-informed 
outside investors and a first-loss or equity claim retained by the financial institution or sold 
to better-informed investors (Boot and Thakor 1993).
2  For example, in DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1999) agency costs from adverse selection are a positive function of the sensitivity 
of an asset-backed security’s cash flows to the private information of the originating 
                                                           
1 We do not deal with pricing issues explicitly in our paper, but refer to Childs, Ott, and Riddiough (1996) and 
Duffie and Garleanu (2001) as representative contributions. 
   
2 Skarabot (2002) contains a model in which the optimal mix of three types of claims, namely senior debt, 
junior debt and equity, maximizes the value of the securitization entity.   4
financial institution.  As a consequence, financial institutions find it optimal to package and 
sell-off a claim that bears less credit risk than the overall pool and to retain a higher-risk 
first-loss claim.  Pass-through securities, where outside investors obtain a pro-rate share of 
the proceeds from an asset pool, rarely emerge as optimal.  DeMarzo (1999) and Glaeser 
and Kallal (1997) find that they are dominated by the sale of portions of single loans, 
because single-entity pooling deprives the originator of the possibility to use the retained 
portion of each single loan as a signal for its true value.
3  Most models hence imply that 
asset pool securitization primarily serves the purpose of reducing refinancing cost and 
reinvesting the proceeds from securitization into higher-return assets, respectively.  Only in 
Boot and Thakor (1993) does optimal security design allow for the transfer of a significant 
amount of credit risk.  
By shifting the focus from single-originator settings with outside investors to multi-
originator settings with inside investors, our model captures credit risk diversification 
effects and hence ascribes a more vital role to active credit risk management rather than 
liquidity management. For the sake of tractability we restrict the analysis in this paper to 
contract structures affine in the returns of loan portfolios. As the literature cited above 
suggests that convex structures that call for a first-loss claim offer efficiency gains over 
affine contracts with pro-rate shares in the proceeds, we interpret the contractual 
arrangements presented as yielding lower-bound efficiency gains over the case of 
independent loan production. 
 
 
2.  Contracts for multi-bank loan pools 
We provide a model of credit risk in joint loan production.  Focusing on the incentive 
effects of pooling loans, we derive closed-form solutions in a highly stylized setting 
 
2.1. Setup 
There is a set of N ≥  2 agents.  We interpret agents as individual savings institutions or 
banks, endowed with preferences and a loan production technology. We describe loans by 
their stochastic returns.  For convenience, we model the loan portfolio of an agent instead 
of the set of an agent’s individual loans.  The value of a loan portfolio is the amount of cash 
Wn that agent n has handed to debtors. 
                                                           
   
3 Subramanyam (1991) and Gorton and Penacchi (1993) hold an opposing view.   5
The return on agent n’s loan portfolio is  , where the random variable m is 
distributed normally with mean µ m and standard deviation σ m, and the random variables cn 
are distributed normally with mean 
n n c m r + =
n c  and standard deviation σ n.  The random variables cn 
are mutually uncorrelated, and are uncorrelated with the random variable m. 
 The  macro  component  m captures credit risk common to the loan portfolios of all 
agents. Major macro-level risk factors are aggregate default risk, common components in 
the valuation of collateral, and so forth.  In general, the macro component represents credit 
risk that cannot be altered or diversified by any agent or group of agents.  The cluster 
component cn captures credit risk common to all loans on the book of an individual bank.  
For example, the cluster component represents risk due to debtors being concentrated 
geographically or in a few industries.  In general, the cluster component is risk that cannot 
be diversified at the level of individual agents, but may be reduced by pooling loans across 
agents. 
  We assume that the agent controls the mean  n c  of the distribution of cn by choosing 
en such that  n n n n e c θ µ + = , where µ n is a real number, θ n is a positive real number, and en is 
a non-negative real number.
4  We think of en as representing credit risk that the agent can 
eliminate by applying sufficient care in the loan production process.  For example, 
appropriate screening and efficient monitoring, using specific knowledge available only to 
the agent, may improve credit quality.  Since the return distribution of loans is capped at the 
face value plus interest payments, reductions in credit risk translate into improved 
profitability. 
 The  constant  θ n captures the agent’s productivity, i.e. the effectiveness in 
controlling loan profitability.  The larger the coefficient, the more sensitive is the loan 
portfolio’s profitability to the agent’s actions. Productivity θ n may be different across 
agents;  some agents presumably find it easier to control credit quality than others.  For 
example, a loan portfolio consisting largely of established manufacturing firms (having 
substantial assets in place) is probably more effectively managed than a loan portfolio of 
growth firms.  A similar argument applies comparing home mortgages and consumer loans. 
                                                           
   
4 For now, we assume that the agent controls directly the profitability of the loan portfolio rather than the risk 
of the portfolio.  The agent being able to control only the first moment, and not the second moment of the 
return distribution, is a restrictive assumption, and we hope to analyze the more general case in the future.   6
Agents are risk-averse and dislike imposing high levels of control en.  To keep the 
exposition simple and facilitate closed-form solutions, we model agents’ preferences by 
mean-variance utility functions 
(1)   () []
2
2
1
 
2
1
n n n n n e R Var A ER R Eu − − = , 
where E and Var denote the expectation and variance operator, Rn is agent n’s profit from 
loan operations, and An is agent n’s coefficient of risk aversion.  If the agent is operating 
independently, Rn = rn.  If the agent joins a credit pool, Rn may be different from rn. 
  This functional form for preferences is standard for individuals.  For organizations 
some discussion is necessary.  Ascribing risk aversion to an organization is a reduced-form 
model of the preferences of actual people within the organization.  For example, the 
managers of savings institutions dislike risk in loan portfolios because bad outcomes may 
tarnish their reputation, and thus diminish their human capital, may increase the probability 
of the board or regulators intervening, and so forth.  Alternatively, an organization exhibits 
risk averse behavior, if the payoff function of the equity holders are convex, e.g. due to 
progressive tax schemes or bankruptcy costs. 
The quadratic
5 cost component for en is usually interpreted as aversion to effort. In 
the case of loan portfolios, the activities of screening and monitoring require resources such 
as loan officers’ time, maintaining data bases, processing loan and debtor specific 
information, prosecuting debtors in default, and so forth.  These activities are associated 
with costs that are directly measurable.  There are costs, however, that are less easily 
assessed.  For example, being more stringent towards debtors in default, which improves 
loan profitability, might cause psychological stress to the agent or reduce her social status.  
Finally, it is worth noting that effort enters the utility function in a way similar to expected 
returns on the loan amount.  Thus, en should be interpreted as rate of effort per loan amount 
rather than a level of effort.   
 
2.2. Independent Operations 
If banks operate in isolation, optimal strategies maximize the utility function (1) with 
respect to the effort level en.  The optimal effort level is e ; marginal benefit θ n equals 
marginal cost en.  The expected profitability of the loan portfolio is  , while the 
n
IO
n θ =
2
n n m θ µ µ + +
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risk is  , and the costs of the loan production are 
2 2
n m σ σ +
2
2
1
n θ , and, therefore, the expected 
utility is  (
2 2
2
1 2
2
1
n m n n n m A σ σ θ µ µ + − + + = ) E
IO
n u .  This expected utility is the benchmark 
against which to measure the benefits of loan pools.  Only if joint production improves 
upon this benchmark expected utility, agents are willing to participate in the pool. 
∑ = n W
W / W w n n =
()
2 2 2
n n m w r σ σ ∑ + =
u n <
2 σ
()
2
2
1     n n n n n e e w R u − ∝ θ
IO
n
IO
n n n n n e e w w < = = θ
E
e
 
2.3. Loan Pools  
The value of the loan pool is W .  Thus, agent n’s percentage contribution to the 
pool is  .  The return on the pool is  ∑ = n n r w   r .  The principal advantage of a 
loan pool is the potential to diversify imperfectly correlated risks.  The variance of the 
pool’s return is Var .  As the pool grows larger, the individual share wn 
of agent n decreases.  Thus, the pool risk decreases under reasonable conditions.  If, for all 
n and some finite numbers u and v,   and W , then Var  as  v n < ()
2
m r σ → ∞ → N .  
This is a direct consequence of the law of large numbers.  Thus, the pool’s risk reduces to 
the macro component for a large pool of banks that are small relative to each other.  This 
captures the intuition that, as the pool grows, risk is diversified across more members.  
However, this intuition is not always true.  For example, adding a very large individual loan 
portfolio to a small pool might increase the risk of the pool.  Similarly, adding a very large 
risk to a relatively safe pool might increase pool risk.  
A naïvely constructed loan pool, ignoring the incentive effects of joint production, 
might stipulate that all members of the pool share in the returns according to wn, the share 
of the loan value contributed.  In this case, the return of agent n’s portfolio is simply r.  
Collecting only terms in the expected utility that depend on en, 
(2)   . 
Thus, the marginal benefit from employing unit of en is no longer θ n but wn times θ n.  By 
the first order condition, agent n chooses effort level 
. 
Since wn is a number less than one, and considerably less than one for large pools, agents 
significantly reduce effort in a pool operating under such a sharing rule.  Agents’ incentive 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
   
5 The form of the cost function is not meant to be too descriptive.  A quadratic cost term captures increasing 
marginal costs, yet delivers tractable solutions.  As with all our simplifying assumptions, more realistic 
choices can be easily implemented in applied work.   8
to shirk, i.e., free-riding on other agents’ effort, is the key problem in joint production.  
Benefits of diversification are bought at the price of greatly reduced production efficiency.  
Depending on the relative magnitude of diversification and reduction in efficiency, a pool 
with such a simple sharing rule might, or might not, be a viable alternative to independent 
operations.  However, this simple sharing rule is rather arbitrary. 
 
2.4.  Contracts 
Trading off the benefits from diversification against the efficiency loss is the task when 
designing contracts for loan pools.  Before agents set up the pool, they bargain over a 
sharing rule for the pool’s profits at the end of the contracting period.  After having reached 
an agreement over the sharing rule, each agent engages in loan production.  At the end of 
the period contracted for, agents share profits and losses according to the sharing rule 
agreed upon.  Agents cannot re-negotiate the sharing rule. 
In general, contracts may depend only on variables that a court of law can observe 
and verify.  We assume that returns on individual portfolios are generally observable and 
verifiable, or ‘contractible’, since elaborate accounting, auditing, and regulatory systems 
are in place.  Hence, the returns of the grand portfolio are also contractible.   
In this paper, we also assume that productivity θ n and risk aversion An are 
observable.  More generally, the agreement upon these values is part of the negotiation 
stage.  However, solving the negotiation game is complicated enough in its most simple 
form.  Therefore, we do not pursue this issue further for the time being.   
Effort might also be contractible although we think it rather unlikely.  Without the 
special knowledge residing with the agent, judging the effort of the agent is difficult.  For 
an outsider it is very costly to assess, for example, the results of screening processes; have 
loans been granted on grounds economically sound, or on the basis of political 
considerations?   
We further require a sharing rule to be feasible in the sense that the revenues of the 
pool are completely distributed among the participants.  Thus, the credit pool is a closed 
system; payments may not flow to, or from, the pool.  The system is closed if  ∑ = n nR w r  
for every realization of the normally distributed random variables rn.  This condition is also 
known as budget balancing.  While the assumption of a closed system is very natural, it is 
difficult to handle mathematically for arbitrary contracts.  Thus, we restrict attention to 
contracts that are simple in structure and guarantee a closed system.  
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We consider only contracts affine in agents’ own returns and pool returns, i.e. 
contracts of the form  r r R n n n n n γ β α + + = .  Such contracts enable agents to benefit from 
diversification (through the third component) and provide incentives (through the second 
component).  Affine contracts in a one-shot game can be justified as arising from a 
continuous-time game with arbitrary contracts (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987).  If he 
agent can observe the result of her actions continuously, and adapt actions accordingly, an 
affine contract is pareto-efficient.  The closed system-condition has strong implications for 
the contract parameters α n, β n, and γ n. 
 
Proposition 1.  If the pool is a closed system, then ∑ = 0 n n wα  and   for 
all agents n. 
β γ β = − = ∑ n n n w 1
 
In other words, the fixed components of the contract serve as pure side payments.  This 
means that some prospective members might pay to join the pool, while others might need 
compensation to participate.  The closed system condition also has strong implications for 
the relation between β n and γ n.  In particular, the coefficient on the individual return 
component is the same across all agents.  Thus, contracts admissible under the closed 
system condition have the form  ( ) r r w R n n i i i n n γ γ α + − + = ∑ 1 .  In other words, agents need 
only bargain over α n and γ n.  The coefficient β  is completely determined by the choice of 
γ n.  For example, if the agents were to choose γ n =0.8 for all n, then beta=0.2. 
A loan pool is viable if all agents are better off participating in the pool than not,  
()
IO
n n Eu R Eu ≥ . 
There may be loan pools that are viable for a strict subset of agents but not for all agents.  
In this case, we redefine the set of agents as one of the subsets such that the loan pool is 
viable for all members of this subset.  It is possible that there is more than one such subset.  
It is also possible that there is a strict subset of agents preferring a viable loan pool amongst 
themselves over a viable loan pool comprising all agents.  In other words, some members 
might wish to exclude other potential members.  We sidestep such issues at the present.  In 
the remainder, we focus on viable loan pools comprising all agents. 
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2.5. Operating the Pool 
Collecting only terms that depend on en, for an agent that takes part in a loan pool operating 
under an affine admissible contract, 
(3)   ()( )
2
2
1     1 E n n n n i i i n e e w R u − − ∝ ∑ ≠ θ γ . 
Thus, under such a contract agent n chooses effort level 
() [] () []
IO
n n i i i n n i i i
P
n e w w e   1 , 0 max   1 , 0 max ∑ ∑ ≠ ≠ − = − = γ θ γ . 
Using the same numerical example as above, if agents agree on γ n =0.8 and if the pool is 
large such that wn goes to zero, the factor ( ) ∑ ≠ −
n i n i wγ 1  approaches 0.2.  In other words, 
under such a contract the level of effort in the pool is 20% of that under independent 
operation. 
In game theory parlance,   is the reaction function for the production stage, given 
a specific contract.  The reaction function does not depend on the other agents’ actions at 
this stage of the game.  It does depend only on the contract, and, therefore, on the actions of 
all agents at the negotiation stage. 
P
n e
 
2.6.  Negotiating Contracts 
Equipped with the reaction function, we analyze the negotiation over loan pool contracts.  
The reaction function enables each participant, at the negotiation stage, to forecast the 
future behavior of all other participants at the subsequent, production stage of the game.  
Taking future behavior into account, potential participants decide – jointly – on the contract 
to be used at the production stage.   
  For simplicity, we consider only the symmetric case in which all agents are 
identical, i.e. we set An = A, µ n = µ, θ n = θ , wn = w, and σ n = σ  for all n.  In this case, 
symmetric, pareto-efficient contracts are natural equilibrium outcomes.  More precisely, if 
agents are identical symmetric, pareto-efficient contracts are in the set of equilibria at the 
negotiation stage. 
 
Proposition 2.  For all N, θ , σ  and A, there is a viable symmetric, pareto-efficient contract 
that stipulates for all n 
0 = n α  and  ,
1 2 2
2
σ θ
σ
γ γ
A
N
N
A
n
+ 




 −
= =  where 0 < γ  < 1. 
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Notably, there exists a viable pareto-efficient contract for all parameter values.  In other 
words, we can always devise a contract that makes pool participants weakly better off than 
operating independently.  Second, the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract depends on the 
productive efficiency, risk aversion, and the risk of individual return component.  The 
contract does not depend on the means of the common component or the individual 
components.  Neither does the risk of the common component affect the contract.  Third, 
under the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract the return to a pool member is a strictly 
convex combination of the individual return and the pool return.  In particular, the 
member’s return has always some exposure to both individual returns and pool returns. 
 
Proposition 3.  The symmetric, pareto-efficient contract exhibits the following properties 
. 0     (4)    and       , 0    (3)       0,    (2)       , 0    (1) 2 >
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
A N
γ
σ
γ
θ
γ γ  
 
Property (1) states that, as the pool grows larger (N increases), the symmetric, pareto-
efficient contract applies less weight to the common component (γ  is smaller).  Since γ  and 
β  are inversely related, this implies a greater weight on the individual return component (β  
is larger).  Thus, agents share less of the common return and retain more of their individual 
returns in large pools.  Intuitively, a larger pool provides inherently more benefits of 
diversification in the common return, so that individual incentives can be strengthened.  A 
complementary intuition is that, as pools grow larger, shirking becomes more pervasive 
inducing contracts with stronger incentives.  Property (2) of the symmetric, pareto-efficient 
contract is that, as the productive efficiency of individual members increases (θ  increases), 
members receive a smaller fraction (γ  decreases) of the pool’s returns and retain more 
individual risk.  More productive agents can control risk at lower cost, and thus receive 
strong incentives to do so.  Properties (3) and (4) are related to risk and risk-aversion, and 
have straight-forward interpretations; more risk in individual return components induces 
more risk-sharing, as does larger risk-aversion. 
 
Under the symmetric contract, all agents provide effort  .
1
1
1
1
IO P e
N
N
N
N





 −
− = 




 −
− = γ θ γ e   
The efficiency factor  γ φ
N
N 1
1
−
− =  captures the difference between the effort agents provide 
in a pool and the effort agents exert when operating independently.  
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Proposition 4.  The efficiency factor φ  of the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract satisfies 
. 0    (5)     , 0    (4)     , 0    (3)     , 0   (2)     , 1 0     ) 1 ( 2 <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
< <
A N
 
φ
σ
φ
θ
φ φ
φ  
 
Property (1) shows that there is always some loss in productive efficiency, since the effort 
contributed to the pool is never as large as when operating independently.  On the other 
hand, incentives are never so weak as to prevent any effort contribution at all.  Property (2) 
states that less effort is contributed to larger pools.  This result is surprising given that 
contracts of larger pools provide stronger incentives [Proposition 3(1)].  However, the 
definition of the efficiency factor φ  shows that the pool size has a direct effect through N 
and an indirect effect through γ .  It so happens that explicitly strengthening incentives in the 
contract does not compensate for the implicit reduction in incentives due to enlarging the 
pool.  Property (3) indicates that more efficient producers are affected less by incentive 
problems, whereas properties (4) and (5) show that more risk or higher risk aversion render 
pool production less efficient. 
  Under a symmetric contract, credit risk, measured as the variance, is  
[] () . 2
1
1
2 




 −
−
− = γ γ σ
N
N
R Var   Thus, the risk factor  ( 




 −
−
− = γ γ ζ 2
1
1
N
N )  captures the 
difference between credit risk when pooling loans and independent operations.  The risk 
factor captures the pool’s diversification potential.  A risk factor of one indicates no 
diversification, a risk factor of zero indicates complete diversification, i.e., elimination of 
idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Proposition 5.  The risk factor ζ  of the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract satiesfies 
. 0    (5)     , 0    (4)     , 0    (3)     , 0   (2)     , 1 0     ) 1 ( 2 <
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
>
∂
∂
<
∂
∂
< <
A N
 
ζ
σ
ζ
θ
ζ ζ
ζ  
 
  Property (1) shows that optimal contracts diversify, but some idiosyncratic risk 
remains.  Not surprisingly, property (2) shows that diversification increases in the number 
of participants.  Property (3) indicates that diversification is lower if the pool member are 
more productive.  This result might be surprising at first sight, but is consistent with 
stronger incentives for more productive agents.  Intuitively, more productive agents face a 
steeper trade-off between incentives and risk.  As expected, properties (4) and (5) indicate 
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that more risk or higher risk aversion induce contracts with a larger extent of 
diversification.   
 
Proposition 6.  Under a symmetric, pareto-efficient contracts agents are strictly better off 
than under independent operations, i.e.,  for all N,  θ ,  σ  and A.  More 
specifically, the utility gain from entering a pool is 
()
IO Eu R Eu >
() .
1
2
2
γ
σ





 −
= − = ∆
N
N A
Eu R Eu Eu
IO
 
 
This result states that the benefits of diversification strictly outweigh the incentive problems 
of joint production under optimally designed contracts.  In other words, if running a pool 
carries no costs other than reduced efficiency, optimally designed pools are always 
profitable!  In practice, there are set-up costs and administrative costs.  The quantity ∆ Eu, 
which is equal to the certainty equivalent return (CER), indicates the upper bound on such 
costs (in percent per annum) for profitable pools.  Proposition 6 shows further that the 
benefits of forming a pool are a function of the pool size N, productive efficiency θ , 
idiosyncratic risk σ
2, and risk aversion A only. 
 
Proposition 7.  The gain from adding a new member to the pool is  . 0
2
2
2 2
> =
∂
∆ ∂
N
A
N
Eu γ σ
 
 
Thus, the largest pool possible is best.  However, as is clear from Proposition 6, the 
marginal benefit of adding new members levels off quickly; the marginal benefit decreases 
at a rate of  , an upper bound on which is 1 / N
2!  In other words, pools of relatively 
modest size achieve already large gains of diversification.   
2 2 / N γ
 
 
3.  Economic Relevance of Loan Pools: A Numerical Example 
To understand better the behavior of contracts and to evaluate loan pools’ economic 
relevance, we calibrate an numerical example.  We discuss a base case, using reasonable 
estimates of the parameters.  In addition, we provide sensitivity analyses for a range of 
parameters.   
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3.1  Empirical Evidence on the Regional Variation in Bankruptcy Rates 
For our calculations, we require an estimate of loan pools’ diversification potential.  One 
source of diversification is the regional variation in credit risk.  As an illustration, we study 
the cross-sectional dependence and variation in bankruptcy across the 96 counties in the 
state of Bavaria.  At the end of 2001, 506 thousand or 17.4% of a total 2.9 million German 
enterprises were located in Bavaria.
6  3,943 Bavarian enterprises went bankrupt in 2001, 
resulting in a total bankruptcy rate of 0.78%
7.  
Figure 1 shows the time-series average of annual bankruptcy rates for each of the 96 
counties.
8  Average bankruptcy rates range from 0.27% to 0.87% suggesting a large 
differential in expected default rates for each county.
9  Figure 2 documents the time-series 
variation of annual bankruptcy rates across the 96 counties.  For each of the 14 years, we 
sort counties into deciles according to bankruptcy rates, and plot the average bankruptcy 
rates for the deciles against the bankruptcy rates for the entire sample.  Average bankruptcy 
rates for the tenth decile exceed bankruptcy rates for the first decile by a factor ranging 
from 3.6 (1992) to 13.0 (1980), indicating - not surprisingly - considerable regional 
differences in bankruptcy rates also for any given year.  Notably, the membership of a 
county to a particular decile or to a small number of adjacent deciles, is not stable over 
time. In fact, not a single county belonged to the same or to the same pair of deciles over 
our observation period.  Instead, 90% of the counties switched between five or more deciles 
and 50% switched between 7 and more deciles.  
Figure 3 and Table 1 provide additional evidence on the variation of bankruptcy 
rates across counties and time. In Figure 2, we rank the 96 counties according to the 
standard deviation of bankruptcy rates over the 14 years.  For 84 out of the 96 counties 
standard deviations are higher than the corresponding value (0.15%) for the entire state of 
Bavaria.  Regressing annual bankruptcy rates for each county on the annual bankruptcy rate 
                                                           
6 Data on the number of enterprises and bankruptcies are from the Federal German Statistical Office 
(www.destatis.de) and the Bavarian Statistical Office (www.statistik.bayern.de) 
7 In 2001, the bankruptcy rate for Germany was considerably higher at 1.11%, although the Bavarian industry 
mix was broadly in line with the German average: 48% of Bavarian enterprises (46% of German enterprises) 
belonged to the services sector, 25% (24%) to the retail/wholesale sector, 11% (10%) to the construction 
sector, 11% (10%) to the manufacturing sector and 7% (8%) to all other sectors. 
8 Due to data unavailability we were only able to compile bankruptcy rates for 14 selected years between 
1980 and 2001. 
   
9 Industry mix does not explain the differential in bankruptcy rates between counties. In a panel study, we 
regressed the difference between a county’s bankruptcy rate and Bavaria’s total bankruptcy rate on the share 
of four industries in the total number of enterprises for this county. We found none of the four coefficients to 
be statistically significant.   15
for Bavaria, we decompose the variation in county bankruptcy rates into a systematic 
component (the R
2 from each regression) and a county-specific component (one minus R
2).  
The dark bars in Figure 3 show the systematic variation in “bankruptcy risk” whereas the 
light colored bars indicate the component that is due to county-specific effects.  The ratio of 
state-wide effects and county-specific effects varies widely across counties but – as 
indicated by a correlation coefficient below 1% - is not related to the total standard 
deviation for a given county.  On average, 50% of the time-series variation in county 
bankruptcy rates is due to specific effects.  Table 1 shows the distribution of the prevalence 
of county-specific effects across the 96 counties.  Not a single county has a well diversified 
portfolio of firms in the sense that county-specific effects play no role in explaining 
bankruptcy rates.  Rather, specific effects dominate systematic effects for half of the 
counties.  All in all, the evidence supports our claim that most banks with a large credit 
exposure in a single county could significantly reduce volatility in default rates if they 
participated in a multi-bank loan pool. 
Statistics from the Bavarian association of savings banks reveal that this insight can 
be directly applied to the situation of its member institutions and arguably also to most 
other German savings banks and to most German co-operative banks.  At the end of 2001, 
84 savings banks operated in Bavaria.  This number came down from 91 at the end of 2000 
and from over 100 during most of the 1980s and 1990s.  Bavarian savings banks are owned 
by local (county or city) governments.  To avoid intra-group competition, savings banks 
may not operate outside their local area or encroach upon their neighbors’ territory.
10  
Hence, the local markets of Bavarian savings banks roughly coincide with the 96 counties 
in our sample.  Moreover, the loan portfolios of Bavarian savings banks, which comprise 
roughly 20% of total bank loans to all Bavarian enterprises and roughly 40% of total bank 
loans to Bavaria’s small and medium sized enterprises, can be safely assumed to be 
representative of the local industry structure.
11  Thus, bankruptcy rates per county should be 
good approximations for the default rates in the loan portfolios of local savings banks. In 
this case, pooling loans would indeed reduce the variance in the loan losses of most 
Bavarian savings banks, allowing them to afford smaller economic equity cushions. 
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3.2.  Calibrating an Example 
First, we estimate of idiosyncratic credit risk, productive efficiency, risk aversion, and the 
number of pool participants.  The average time-series standard deviation of county 
bankruptcy rates is 0.25%, of which approximately 0.7 (R
2 = 50%) is idiosyncratic to each 
county.  We assume that the bankruptcy rate is a good proxy for the default rate of county 
banks.  Assuming a stable recovery rate, we arrive at idiosyncratic credit risk (defined as 
annual standard deviation of returns due to credit defaults) of σ
2 = 0.125% of an average 
bank’s loan portfolio.
12  This number might appear too small to bother.  We stress, 
however, that total default risk, which banks and regulators clearly consider substantial, is 
of similar magnitude.  The reason is, of course, the considerable leverage in bank balance 
sheets.  While credit risk is small compared to total bank assets, it is more substantial when 
compared to banks’ regulatory equity.  Assuming a leverage of 20, total credit risk 
contributes 500 basis points to volatility on equity.  Accordingly, idiosyncratic, 
diversifiable risk is 350 basis points volatility on equity.  From this perspective, credit risk 
is substantial, consistent with the amount of resources devoted to risk management.   
  To obtain an estimate of productivity, we suggest that 1% p.a. in costs should 
generate 1% p.a. in added return from fewer defaults and higher recovery rates.  These 
figures imply a productivity estimate θ  = 0.05.  This number appears plausible, but is not 
based on any data.  Finally, we require an estimate of risk aversion.  Commonly numbers 
between 1 and 10 are regarded reasonable.  We opt for the middle, A = 5.  For the number 
of pool members, we choose the number of counties, N = 96.  These numbers constitute the 
base case. 
  The optimal contract parameters are γ  = 71% and β  = 29%.  Thus, the return 
accruing to a pool member is an average of the pool return weighted by 0.71 and the 
individual member’s loan performance weighted by 0.29.  The effort factor is 
approximately 0.29, i.e., pool members provide only roughly one third of the effort they 
would provide if operating independently.  Idiosyncratic credit risk is almost entirely 
eliminated at 0.2% (compared to 3.5% under independent operations).  The net effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 Hackethal (2003) provides more detail on the German savings banking sector and its legal ramifications. 
11 A comparison of the Bavarian industry mix (by number) with the industry mix of the aggregated loan 
portfolio of all Bavarian savings banks (by outstanding loan amounts) for 2001 shows notable deviations only 
for the retail/wholesale and the construction sectors. These deviations can, however, be explained by the 
smaller balance sheet of the typical retailer as compared to the typical construction enterprise. 
   
12 From the Bavarian data, the expected loss from credit defaults is 0.55% per annum.   17
lower effort and lower credit risk induces a certainty equivalent return (CER) gain of 
0.23%.  In other words, participating in a loan pool has the same value to equity holders as 
receiving an additional 23 basis points with certainty.   
  Next, we study the effect of varying the pool size N.  In Figure 3, we depict the 
effect on the contract parameter γ , the efficiency factor φ , and the CER from pooling loans.  
Except for the pool size N, all parameters are the same as in the base case.  Figure 3 shows 
that the contract parameter, efficiency factor, and the CER all stabilize very quickly as N 
grows.  Above 20 members, changes are barely perceivable.   
  Figure 4 shows the dependence of the contract variables on productive efficiency θ .  
Here the patterns are more interesting.  For values of θ  between 0 and 0.25, both the 
contract parameter γ  and the efficiency factor φ  vary widely between 0% and 100%.  Even 
in the smaller θ  region between 0 and 0.1, γ  varies between 100% and 40%.  Accordingly, 
CER’s also vary greatly between 30 bp and 0 bp.  Thus, obtaining a precise estimate of the 
productivity parameter θ  is very important when designing optimal contracts.   
  Figure 5 depicts the relation between idiosyncratic credit risk σ  and the contract 
variables.  Over the range between 0% and 7.5% volatility, the contract parameter γ  
increases from 0% to roughly 90%.  In a narrower range of 1% around the base case 
volatility of 3.5%, γ  varies between approximately 60% and 80%, and the CER varies 
between 10 bp and 50 bp.   
  In general, we find that obtaining precise estimates for the parameters of the 
problem, namely productive efficiency θ , idiosyncratic credit risk σ , and risk aversion A is 
very important for determining optimal contracts.  In contrast, the number of pool 
participants, as long as it is above reasonable minimum (say ten), is not crucial. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we devise contracts, which are optimal within a class of simple (affine) 
contracts, for multi-bank loan pools.  Affine contracts are pareto-efficient in a continuous 
control setting (Holmström and Milgrom, 1987), and, thus, cover a wide range of practical 
cases.  Optimal contracts strike the ideal balance between diversifying credit risk and 
inducing incentives to manage loan portfolios effectively.  Loan pools enable small and 
medium-sized banks to benefit from diversifying credit risk, while remaining independent 
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and exploiting local knowledge.  We argue that loan pools are a cost-efficient alternative to 
market-based solutions such as credit sales and collateralized loan obligations.  Information 
asymmetries are presumably lower between banks of similar types than between banks and 
general investors. 
  To gauge the benefits of loan pools, we provide empirical evidence on the cross-
sectional and time-series variation in bankruptcy rates, which proxy for default risk, within 
the German state of Bavaria.  The variation in the state-wide bankruptcy rate explains, on 
average, 50% of the time-series variation in bankruptcy rates of individual counties, 
typically corresponding to the area covered by individual savings banks.  In other words, 
50% of credit risk of individual institutions is idiosyncratic and, thus, can be diversified in 
principle.  For reasonable estimates of productive efficiency and risk aversion, we find that 
optimal contracts specify pool members’ returns as a combination of 70% pool returns and 
30% returns on the performance of the member’s loan portfolio.  Such a contract reduces 
idiosyncratic risk by roughly 90% and effort by roughly 70%.  The net benefit, which we 
measure as the gain in certainty equivalent return, of forming a loan pool is 23 basis points 
in this example. 
  In this paper, we restrict our attention to the simplest problem.  In an straight-
forward extension, we may allow for heterogeneous participants in terms of size, 
productivity, credit risk in the loan portfolio, and risk aversion.  We expect differences in 
efficiency and credit risk across banks to generate patterns in contract parameters.  In 
particular, larger or riskier banks, contributing more risk to the pool risk, will receive less 
exposure to individual contribution.  More productive or less risk averse banks, being able 
to deal more efficiently with risk, will be exposed more to individual performance.   
Furthermore, considering also non-affine contract structures, i.e., more debt-like structures, 
could provide interesting insights.  In particular, in the presence of asymmetric information 
(about efficiency and credit risk) more complex structures probably offer efficiency gains 
over simple, affine contracts.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Since the component α n does not depend on the realization of returns, and the closed 
system condition must hold for every realization of returns, ∑ = 0 n n w α . 
Agent  n’s return under the contract is  ∑ + + =
i i i n n n n n r w r R γ β α .  The closed system 
condition requires that  ( ) ∑ ∑ ∑ = n n i i i r w r w +
n n n n n r w γ β  for every realization (of the vector 
of random variables rn).  Rewriting,  [ ] ∑ ∑ = − + n n i i i n r w w 0 1 γ β
∑ + n β
n  for every realization (of 
the vector of rn’s).  Given any number of unique realizations (of the vector), this forms a 
system of linear equations with as many equations as realizations.  The set of unique 
realizations is uncountable.  However, uncountably many unique realizations are linear 
transformations of other unique realizations (an example is “all returns are 1%” and the 
linear transform “all returns are 2%”). Nonetheless, the number of linearly independent 
unique realizations is uncountable, while the number n of variables is finite.  Therefore, the 
solution of this system of equations is trivial.  Thus, for all n  .  = − 0 1 i i wγ
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
(1)  From proposition 1 and α n = α  for all n, α  = 0. 
(2)  If optimal effort (as prescribed by the reaction function) is strictly positive (we show 
below that this is indeed the case for optimal contracts), the expected utility, given optimal 
effort, under the contract γ  is 
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2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2 2 2
2 2
2
















− + − + − 




 −
− − 




 −
− + + =
N N
A
N
N
N
N
R Eu m n
γ γ
γ σ σ γ
θ
γ θ µ µ  
Differentiating with respect to γ , applying the first-order condition, and solving for γ  yields 
the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract. 
(3)  Clearly,  . 0
1 2 2 > +
−
σ θ A
N
N   Thus, γ  > 0.  We have further  
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Since  γ β + = 1  and γ  > 0 and β  > 0, it follows that γ  < 1.  This also shows that, under the 
optimal contract, effort is strictly positive. 
(4)  Calculating the difference in expected utility under the pool and independent 
operations, 
()
.
1 1 1
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2 2 2
2
σ γ θ σ
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N
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Substituting the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract 
   . 0
1
2
2
>
−
= ∆
N
N A
Eu
σ
γ  
Thus, the pool is (strictly) viable under the symmetric, pareto-efficient contract. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
(1)  () () . 0 1
1
1
< −
−
−
=
∂
∂
γ γ
γ
N N N
 
(2)  () . 0 1
2
< −
−
=
∂
∂
γ γ
θ θ
γ  
(3)  () . 0 1
1
2 2 > − =
∂
∂
γ γ
σ σ
γ  
(4)  () . 0 1
1
> − =
∂
∂
γ γ
γ
A A
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
(1)  Both,  1
1
0 <
−
<
N
N  and 0 1 < <γ .  Thus,  1
1
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−
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N
0 . 
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The other properties follow immediately from Proposition 5. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. 
(1) The risk factor is a positive parabola in γ   
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Proof of Proposition 6. 
See (4) in the Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. 
Straightforward. 
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Table 1:  Fraction of county-specific effects (frequencies for 96 counties) 
Range 0-
0.1 
0.1-
0.2 
0.2-
0.3 
0.3-
0.4 
0.4-
0.5 
0.5-
0.6 
0.6-
0.7 
0.7-
0.8 
0.8-
0.9 0,9-1
Frequency  0 2  12 17 17 23 11  8  4  2 
Cum. 
Frequency    0% 2%  15% 32% 50% 74%  85%  94% 98%  100%
 
 
Figure 1. Average bankruptcy rates in Bavarian counties (1980-2001) 
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Figure 2. Average bankruptcy rates by deciles and year 
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Figure 3. Time-series standard deviation of bankruptcy rates by county (1980-2001) 
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Figure 4.  Contracts and number of pool members 
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Figure 5.  Contracts and productivity 
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Figure 6.  Contracts and idiosyncratic credit risk 
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Figure 7.  Contracts and risk aversion 
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